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Abstract
Federated learning is a setting where agents, each with access
to their own data source, combine models learned from lo-
cal data to create a global model. If agents are drawing their
data from different distributions, though, federated learning
might produce a biased global model that is not optimal for
each agent. This means that agents face a fundamental ques-
tion: should they join the global model or stay with their local
model? In this work, we show how this situation can be nat-
urally analyzed through the framework of coalitional game
theory.
Motivated by these considerations, we propose the following
game: there are heterogeneous players with different model
parameters governing their data distribution and different
amounts of data they have noisily drawn from their own dis-
tribution. Each player’s goal is to obtain a model with mini-
mal expected mean squared error (MSE) on their own distri-
bution. They have a choice of fitting a model based solely on
their own data, or combining their learned parameters with
those of some subset of the other players. Combining models
reduces the variance component of their error through access
to more data, but increases the bias because of the heterogene-
ity of distributions. In this work, we derive exact expected
MSE values for problems in linear regression and mean esti-
mation. We use these values to analyze the resulting game in
the framework of hedonic game theory; we study how players
might divide into coalitions, where each set of players within
a coalition jointly constructs a single model. In a case with
arbitrarily many players that each have either a “small” or
“large” amount of data, we constructively show that there al-
ways exists a stable partition of players into coalitions.
1 Introduction
Imagine a situation as follows: a hospital is trying to evaluate
the effectiveness of a certain procedure based on data it has
collected from procedures done on patients in their facilities.
It seems likely that certain attributes of the patient influences
the effectiveness of the procedure, so the hospital analysts
opt to fit a linear regression model with parameters θˆ. How-
ever, because of the limited amount of data the hospital has
access to, this model has relatively high error. Luckily, other
hospitals also have data from implementations of this same
procedure. However, for reasons of privacy, data incompati-
bility, data size, or other operational considerations, the hos-
pitals don’t wish to share raw patient data. Instead, they they
opt to combine their models by taking a weighted average
of the parameters learned by each hospital. If there are M
hospitals and hospital i has ni samples, the combined model
parameters would look like:
θˆf =
1∑M
i=1 ni
M∑
i=1
θˆi · ni
The situation described above could be viewed as a styl-
ized model of federated learning. Federated learning is a
distributed learning process that is currently experiencing
rapid innovations and widespread implementation (Li et al.
2020; Kairouz et al. 2019). It is commonly used in cases
where data is distributed across multiple agents and can-
not be combined centrally for training. For example, fed-
erated learning is implemented in word prediction on cell
phones, where transferring the raw text data would be infea-
sible given its large size (and sensitive content). Themotivat-
ing factor for using federated learning is that access to more
data will reduce the variance in a learned model, reducing
its error.
However, there could be a downside to using federated
learning. In the hospital example, it seems quite reason-
able that certain hospitals might have different true gener-
ating models for their data, based on the differences in pa-
tient populations or variants of the procedure implementa-
tion, for example. Two dissimilar hospitals that are federat-
ing together will see a decrease in their model’s error due to
model variance, but an increase in their error due to model
bias. This raises some fundamental questions for each partic-
ipating hospital - or, more generally, each agent i consider-
ing federated learning. Which other agents should i federate
with in order to minimize its error? Will those other agents
be interested in federating with i? Does there exist some sta-
ble arrangement of agents into federating clusters, and if so,
what does that arrangement look like?
Numerous works have explored the issue of heteroge-
neous data in federated learning - we discuss specifically
how they relate to ours in a later section. Often the goal
in these lines of work is to achieve equality in error rates
guaranteed to each agent, potentially by actively collecting
more data or using transfer learning to ensure the model
better fits local data. However, to our knowledge, there has
not yet been work that systematically looks at the participa-
tion questions inherent in federated learning through the lens
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of game theory — especially the theory of hedonic games,
which studies the formation of self-sustaining coalitions.
In a hedonic game, players are grouped together into clus-
ters or coalitions: the overall collection of coalitions is called
a coalition structure. Each player’s utility depends solely
on the identity of the other players in its coalition. A com-
mon question in hedonic games is the stability of a coali-
tion structure. A coalition structure Π is core-stable (or “in
the core”) if there does not exist a coalition C so that every
player in C prefersC to its coalition in Π. A coalition struc-
ture is individually stable if there does not exist a coalition
C ∈ Π so that a player i 6∈ C prefers C ∪ {i} to its arrange-
ment in Π and all players in C weakly prefer C ∪ {i} to C
(Bogomolnaia and Jackson 2002).
To explain the analogy of federated learning to hedonic
games, we first consider that each agent in federated learn-
ing is a player in a hedonic game. A player is in coalition
with other players if it is federating with them. Its cost is its
expected error in a given federating cluster, which depends
only on the identity of other players in its federating cluster.
Players are assumed to be able to move between federating
clusters only if doing so would benefit itself and not harm
other players in the cluster it is moving to: notably, we allow
players to freely leave a cluster, even if doing so would harm
the players in the cluster it leaves behind.
The present work: Analyzing federated learning through
hedonic game theory In this work, we use the framework
of hedonic games to analyze the stability of coalitions in
data-sharing applications that capture key issues in feder-
ated learning. By working through a sequence of deliber-
ately stylized models, we obtain some general insights about
participation and stability in these kinds of applications.
The first case we consider is where all players have the
same number of data points. We show that in this game,
when the number of data points n is fairly small, the only
core-stable coalition structure is to have all players federat-
ing together. When n is large, the only core-stable coalition
structure is to have all players separate. There exists a point
case of intermediate n size where all coalition structures are
core-stable. Next, in the case where all players have either
one of two sizes (“small” or “large”), the analysis is more
complicated, but we demonstrate constructively that there
always exists a stable partition of players into clusters.
We are only able to produce these hedonic game theory
results because of our derivations of exact error values for
the underlying inference problems. We calculate these val-
ues for agents federating in two situation: 1) a mean estima-
tion problem and 2) a linear regression problem. The error
values depend on the number of samples each agent has ac-
cess to, with the expectation taken over the values of sam-
ples each agent draws as well as the possible different true
parameters of the data each player is trying to model. Our
results are completely independent of the generating distri-
butions used, relying only weakly on the ratio of two param-
eters.
Finally, we analyze two additional models, one of which
ensures local learning is never in the core, and the other of
Coalition structure erra(·) errb(·) errc(·)
{a}, {b}, {c} 2 2 2
{a, b}, {c} 1.5 1.5 2
{a, b, c} 1.3 1.3 1.3
Table 1: The expected errors of players in each coalition
when all three players have 5 samples each, with parame-
ters µe = 10, σ
2 = 1. Each row denotes a different coalition
partition: for example, {a, b}{c} indicates that players a and
b are federating together while c is alone. Coalitions that are
identical up to renaming of players are omitted.
Coalition structure erra(·) errb(·) errc(·)
{a}, {b}, {c} 2 2 0.4
{a, b}, {c} 1.5 1.5 0.4
{a}, {b, c} 2 1.72 0.39
{a, b, c} 1.55 1.55 0.41
Table 2: The expected errors of players in each coalition
when players a and b have 5 samples each and player c has
25 samples, with parameters µe = 10, σ
2 = 1.
which ensures the coalition structure where all players are
federating together is the sole element in the core.
2 Motivating example
Tomotivate our problem and clarify the types of analyses we
will be exploring, we will first work through a simple moti-
vating example. In this case, we will consider three players,
a, b, and c, who are each trying to solve a mean-estimation
problem. Calculating the error each player can expect re-
quires two parameters: µe, which reflects the average er-
ror each player experiences when sampling data from its
own personal distribution, and σ2, which reflects the aver-
age variance in the true parameters between players. We will
discuss these more in future sections, including how to han-
dle cases where they may be imperfectly known, but for now
we will take them to be fixed.
We will first assume that each player has 5 samples from
their local data distribution: Table 1 gives the error each
player can expect in this situation. Note that because the
players have the same number of samples, players in iden-
tical situations have identical errors. Every player sees its
error minimized in the “grand coalition” πg where all three
players are federating together. This implies that the only ar-
rangement that is stable (core-stable or individually stable)
is πg . This is part of a broader pattern that we will more
Coalition structure erra(·) errb(·) errc(·)
{a}, {b}, {c} 0.4 0.4 0.4
{a, b}, {c} 0.7 0.7 0.4
{a, b, c} 0.8 0.8 0.8
Table 3: The expected errors of players in each coalition
when players a, b, c each have 25 samples, with parameters
µe = 10, σ
2 = 1.
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formally investigate in later sections.
Next, we will assume that player c increases the amount
of samples it has from 5 to 25: Table 2 demonstrates the
error each player can expect in this situation. Here, the
players have different preferences over which arrangement
they would most prefer. The “small” players a and b would
most prefer {a, b}{c}, whereas the “large” player c would
most prefer {a}, {b, c} or (identically) {b}, {a, c}. However
out of all of these coalition structures, only {a, b}, {c} is
stable (either core stable or individually stable). Note that
{a}, {b, c} is not core stable because the coalition C =
{a, b} is one where each player prefers C to its current sit-
uation. It is also not individually stable because of the same
reason: player b could leave its coalition to join {a}, and
the resulting set {a, b} leads to a reduction in both of their
errors.
Finally, we will assume that all three players have 25
samples: this example is shown in Table 3. As in Table 1,
the players have identical preferences. However, in the case
where they each had 5 samples, they minimized their error
by being together. In the case where they each have 25 sam-
ples, the players minimize their error by being alone.
In later sections we will give theoretical results that ex-
plain this example more fully, but understanding the core-
stable partitions here will help to build intuition for more
general results.
3 Model and assumptions
Model and technical assumptions
This section introduces our model, which we will analyze
in later sections. In our model, we assume that there is a
fixed set of [M ] players. Player j has a fixed number of
samples, nj . Though the number of samples is fixed, it is
possible to analyze a varying number of samples by investi-
gating all games involving the relevant number of samples.
Each player draws their true parameters i.i.d. (independent
and identically distributed) (θj , ǫ
2
j) ∼ Θ. ǫ
2
j represents the
amount of noise present in the sampling process for a given
player.
In the case of mean estimation, θj is a scalar representing
the true mean of player j. Player j draws samples i.i.d. from
its true distribution: Y ∼ Dj(θj , ǫ
2
j). Samples are drawn
with variance ǫ2j around the true mean of the distribution.
In the case of linear regression, θj is a D-dimensional
vector representing the coefficients on the true classifica-
tion function, which is also assumed to be linear. Each
player draws nj input datapoints from their own input dis-
tribution Xj ∼ Xj such that Ex∼Xj [x
Tx] = Σj . They
then noisily observe the outputs, drawing values i.i.d. Yj ∼
Dj(XTj θj, ǫ
2
j), where ǫ
2
j again denotes the variance of how
samples are drawn around the true mean.
We denote µe = E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ[ǫ
2
i ]: the expectation of the er-
ror parameter. In the mean estimation case, σ2 = V ar(θi)
represents the variance around the mean. In the linear re-
gression case, σ2d = V ar(θ
d
i ). For simplicity, most of our
analysis assumes each dimension in the coefficient is drawn
independently from each other, but we relax this in the ap-
pendix.
We assume that each player knows how many samples it
has access to. It may or may not have access to the data itself,
but it does not know how its values (or its parameters) differ
from the mean. For example, it does not know if the data it
has is unusually noisy or if its true mean lies far from the
true mean of other players.
All of the stability analysis results depend on the param-
eters µe and σ
2. However, the reliance is fairly weak: often
the player only needs to know the ratio µe
σ2
, and frequently
only needs to know whether the number of samples a player
has nj is larger or smaller than
µe
σ2
.
Much of this paper analyzes the stability of coalition
structures. In particular, we focus on core stability and in-
dividual stability. Analyzing stability could be relevant be-
cause players can actually move between coalitions. How-
ever, even if players aren’t able to actually move, analyzing
the stability of a coalition tells us something about its op-
timality for each set of players. We will refer to the coali-
tion partition where all players are grouped together as the
“grand coalition”.
Related works
Incentives and federated learning: Blum et al. (2017)
describes an approach to handling heterogeneous data where
more samples are iteratively gathered from each agent in a
way so that all agents are incentivized to participate in the
grand coalition during federated learning. Duan et al. (2021)
builds a framework to schedule data augmentation and re-
sampling. Yu, Bagdasaryan, and Shmatikov (2020) demon-
strates empirically that there can be cases where individu-
als get lower error with local training than federated and
evaluates empirical solutions. Wang et al. (2020) analyzes
the question of when it makes sense to split or not to
split datasets drawn from different distributions. Finally,
Blum et al. (2020) analyzes notions of envy and efficiency
with respect to sampling allocations in federated learning.
Transfer learning: Mansour et al. (2020) and
Deng, Kamani, and Mahdavi (2020) both propose the-
oretical methods for using transfer learning to minimize
error provided to agents with heterogeneous data. Li et al.
(2019) and Martinez, Bertran, and Sapiro (2020) both
provide methods to produce a more uniform level of error
rates across agents participating in federated learning.
Clustering and federated learning:
Sattler, Muller, and Samek (2020) and
Shlezinger, Rini, and Eldar (2020) provide an algorithm to
“cluster” together players with similar data distributions
with the aim of providing them with lower error. They differ
from our approach in that they consider the case where there
is some knowledge of each player’s data distribution, where
we only assume knowledge of the number of data points.
Additionally, their approach doesn’t explicitly consider
agents to be game-theoretic actors in the same way that this
one does. Interestingly, Guazzone, Anglano, and Sereno
(2014) uses a game theoretic framework to analyze feder-
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ated learning, but with the aim of minimizing energy usage,
not error rate.
Normative assumptions
This paper is primarily descriptive: it aims to model a phe-
nomenon in the world, not to say whether that phenomenon
is good or bad. For example, it could be that society as
a whole values situations where many players federate to-
gether and might wish to require players to do so, regardless
of whether this minimizes their error. It might be the case
that society prefers all players, regardless of howmany sam-
ples they have access to, have roughly similar error rates.
Our use of the expected mean squared error is also worth
reflecting on: it assumes that over- and under-estimates are
equally costly and that larger mis-estimates are more costly.
In a more subtle point, we are taking the expectedMSE over
parameter draws E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ. A player with a true mean that
happens to fall far from the mean might experience a much
higher error than its expected MSE.
In the entirely of this paper, we are taking as fixed the
requirement that data not be shared, either for privacy or
technical capability reasons, and so are implicitly valuing
that requirement more than the desire for lower error. We
are also assuming that the problem at hand is completely en-
compassed by the machine learning task, which might omit
the fact that non-machine learning solutions may be better
suited. It also may be the fact that technical requirements
other than error rate are more important: for example, the
desire to balance the amount of computation done by each
agent.
4 Expected error results
This paper’s first contribution is to derive exact expected val-
ues for the MSE of players under different situations. The
fact that these values are exact allows us to precisely reason
about each player’s incentives in later sections. We will state
the main lemmas here and provide the proofs in Appendix
B.
First, we provide results from mean estimation. Note that
the local error decays exponentially with the number of sam-
ples the player has access to. The error player j gets while
participating in federated error depends in a more compli-
cated way on the number of samples player j has, as well as
the number of samples each member in the coalition has.
Lemma 4.1. For mean estimation, the expected MSE of lo-
cal estimation for a player with nj samples is
µe
nj
.
Lemma 4.2. For mean estimation, the expected MSE of fed-
erated estimation for a player with nj samples is
µe
N
+
∑
i6=j n
2
i + (N − nj)
2
N2
σ2
where N =
∑M
i=1 ni.
Next, we provide results from linear regression. For each
situation, we provide results that hold in general as well as
simplified results that hold for the situation whereXi follows
a certain distribution. Note that when the number of samples
nj is much larger than the dimension of the problemD, the
error values in the linear regression case take on exactly the
same form as those in mean estimation.
Lemma 4.3. For linear regression, the expected MSE of lo-
cal estimation for a player with nj samples is
µe · tr
[
ΣjEXj∼Xj
[(
XTj Xj
)−1]]
If the distribution of input values Xj is a D-dimensional
multivariate normal distribution with 0 mean, then, the ex-
pected MSE of local estimation can be simplified to:
µe
nj −D − 2
D
Lemma 4.4. For linear regression, the expectedMSE of fed-
erated estimation for a player with nj samples is:
Lj +
∑
i6=j n
2
i + (N − nj)
2
N2
D∑
d=1
Ex∼Xj [(x
d)2] · σ2d
where Lj is equal to:
µe
M∑
i=1
n2i
N2
tr[ΣjEY∼D(θi,ǫ2i )
[
(XTi Xi)
−1
]
or, if the distribution of input values Xi isa D-dimensional
multivariate normal distribution with 0 mean, can be simpli-
fied to
µe
M∑
i=1
n2i
N2
D
ni −D − 2
For linear regression, we define the hedonic game to have
cost in local estimation equal to:
µe
nj
·D
In the federated case, we define the Lj term to be:
µe
M∑
i=1
ni
N
·D
In the limit of nj → ∞, the cost is equal to the error rate
the player experiences. For ease of analysis, we will operate
with the cost rather than the error because cost closely ap-
proximates error, but has the added advantage of fitting ex-
actly into the form of the error in the mean estimation game.
This enables us to apply the coalition formation analysis in
the next section to linear regression as well. In the next sec-
tion we will focus on the mean estimation case, where we
will use “cost” and “error” interchangably.
5 Coalition formation: all players have same
number of samples
In this section, we analyze the stability of coalition struc-
tures in two cases. We will use πl to refer to the coalition
partition where all players are alone and πg to refer to the
coalition where all players are together.
In the first case, we assume all players have the same num-
ber of samples: ni = n. The error for mean estimation sim-
plifies greatly, as the lemma below shows.
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Lemma 5.1. If all players have the same number of samples
n, then:
• If n < µe
σ2
, players minimize their error in πl.
• If n > µe
σ2
, players minimize their error in πg.
• If n = µe
σ2
, players are indifferent between any arrange-
ment of players.
Proof. In the case that all players have the same number of
samples, we can use ni = n to simplify the error term:
µe
M · n
+ σ2
(M − 1) · n2 + (M − 1)2 · n2
M2 · n2
=
µe
M · n
+ σ2
M − 1
M
In order to see whether players would prefer a larger group
(higher M ) or a smaller group (smaller M ), we take the
derivative of the error with respect toM :
−
µe
M2 · n
+
σ2
M2
=
σ2 · n− µe
n ·M2
This is positive when n > µe
n
: a player gets higher error the
more players it is federating with. This is negative when n <
µe
σ2
: a player gets lower error the more players it is federating
with. This is 0 when n = µe
σ2
, which implies players should
be indifferent between different arrangements. Plugging in
for n = µe
σ2
in the error equation gives:
µe · σ2
M · µe
+ σ2
M − 1
M
= σ2
which is equivalent to the error a player would get alone:
µe
n
=
µe · σ2
µe
= σ2
This formulation allows us to classify the core of this
problem in a very clean way. It turns out that, for all cases
where n < µe
σ2
, πg is the only element in the core: this con-
tinues until n = µe
σ2
, where all arrangements are in the core.
For n > µe
σ2
, πl becomes the only element in the core.
Lemma 5.2. If all players have the same number of samples
n, then:
• If n < µe
σ2
, πg is the only partition that is core-stable.
• If n > µe
σ2
, πl is the only partition that is core-stable.
• If n = µe
σ2
, any arrangement of players is core-stable.
Proof. If a partition π is optimal for every player, then it
is core stable: there does not exist a coalition C where all
players preferC to π, because there does not exist a coalition
where any players prefer C to π.
If a partition π is optimal for every player, then no other
partition can be core stable: any set of players not in their
optimal configuration could form a coalition C where all
players would prefer C.
In the case that players are indifferent between any ar-
rangement, then for any partition π and any competing coali-
tion C, all players would be indifferent between π and C, so
π is core stable.
6 Coalition formation: Small & large player
case
In this section, we add another layer of depth by allowing
players to come in one of two “sizes”. “Small” players have
ns samples and “large” ones have nℓ samples, with ns < nℓ.
We demonstrate that versions of the game in this pattern al-
ways have a stable partition by constructively producing an
element that is stable. Note that this is not true in general of
hedonic games. As discussed in Bogomolnaia and Jackson
(2002), there are multiple instances where a game might
have no stable partition.
To characterize this space, we divide it into cases de-
pending on the relative size of ns, nℓ. We will use the no-
tation π(s, ℓ) to denote a coalition with s small players and
ℓ large players, out of a total of S and L present. We will use
π(s1, ℓ1) ≻0 π(s2, ℓ2) to mean that the small players prefer
coalition π(s1, ℓ1) to π(s2, ℓ2) and π(s1, ℓ1) ≻1 π(s2, ℓ2) to
mean the same preference, but for large players. All proofs
from this section are present in Appendix C.
Case: ns, nℓ ≥
µe
σ2
The first case is when ns is fairly large: it turns out that each
playerminimizes their error by using local estimation, which
implies that πl is in the core. The intuitive explanation here
is that the reduction in variance that federation would bring
is more than offset by the increase in bias. Using the lemmas
below tells us that when ns >
µe
σ2
, πl is the only element in
the core and when ns =
µe
σ2
then any arrangement where the
large players are alone are is in the core.
Lemma 6.1. If ni >
µe
σ2
for all i ∈ [M ], then πl is the
unique element in the core.
Lemma 6.2. If ni ≥
µe
σ2
for all i ∈ [M ], with nk >
µe
σ2
for at
least one player k, then any arrangement where the players
with samples nk >
µe
σ2
are alone is in the core.
Case: ns, nℓ ≤
µe
σ2
Next, we explore the case where ns ≤
µe
σ2
. First, there are
several building block lemmas we will find useful.
Lemma 6.3. If ns ≤
µe
σ2
and ns < nℓ, a small player in
a coalition with s small players and ℓ large players always
prefers s as large as possible:
s2 > s1 ⇒ π(s2, ℓ) ≻0 π(s1, ℓ)
Lemma 6.4. If nℓ ≥
µe
σ2
and ns < nℓ, a large player in
a coalition with s small players and ℓ large players always
prefers ℓ as small as possible:
ℓ2 < ℓ1 ⇒ π(s, ℓ2) ≻1 π(s, ℓ2)
Lemma 6.5. Assume ns ≤
µe
σ2
and ns < nℓ. If nℓ ≤
µe
σ2
, a
small player in a coalition with s small players and ℓ large
players always prefers ℓ as large as possible. If nℓ >
µe
σ2
,
as ℓ is increased, the small player’s error first increases and
then decreases: the player achieves a maximum error, and
then overall error decreases with ℓ.
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Lemma 6.6. Assume ns ≤
µe
σ2
, nℓ ≥
µe
σ2
, and ns < nℓ. As
s is increased, the large player’s error first decreases and
then increases: the large player achieves a minimum level of
error, and afterwards its error increases with s.
These lemmas help us produce the theorem below. The
proof of the theorem should not be immediately obvious
from the above lemmas and is explained in detail in the ap-
pendix.
Theorem 6.7. If nℓ ≤
µe
σ2
and ns < nℓ, then the grand
coalition πg is core-stable.
Case: ns <
µe
σ2
, nℓ >
µe
σ2
Finally, we consider the case where ns <
µe
σ2
and nℓ >
µe
σ2
.
We will prove the following theorem:
Theorem 6.8. Assume nl >
µe
σ2
. Then, there exists an ar-
rangement of small and large players that is individually
stable.
As discussed previously, individual stability is a notion of
stability that is, roughly speaking, weaker than core stability.
The theorem above raises the intriguing possibility that we
could strengthen the result to show that there always exists
a core-stable arrangement. Though we do not show that in
this work, we believe it to be true and have included the
additional lemma below that, while not used in our theorem,
would be helpful in proving a core stability result.
Lemma 6.9. Consider two coalitions π(s1, ℓ1) and
π(s2, ℓ2) with s2 < s1. Then, it is not possible to pick ℓ2
so that π(s1, ℓ1) ≻0 π(s2, ℓ2) and π(s1, ℓ1) ≻1 π(s2, ℓ2)
Next, a proof of the theorem:
Proof. We will prove this directly by calculating an arrange-
ment that is individually stable.
First, group all of the small players together. Then cal-
culate ℓ′ = max ℓ such that π(S, ℓ)  π(0, 1): the largest
number of large players that can be in the coalition such
that the large players prefer this to being alone. Check if
π(S, ℓ) ≻ π(S, 0). If this is true, make the final arrange-
ment π(S, 0), π(0, 1) · L: by previous lemmas around how
the small player’s error changes with ℓ, we know that if
π(S, ℓ) ≻ π(S, 0), then π(S, ℓ′) ≻ π(S, 0) for all ℓ′ < ℓ.
We will show that this is individually stable by showing
no players wish to unilaterally deviate.
• No small player wishes to go to π(1, 0): reducing the
number of small players in a group from S to 1 mono-
tonically increases the error the small player faces.
• No small player wishes to go to π(1, 1): it is possible
to reach this state by first going from π(S, 0) to π(S, 1)
(which would increase error because 1 ≤ ℓ′ and π(S, ℓ) ≺
π(S, 0)) and then from π(S, 1) to π(1, 1) (which would
increase error because reducing the number of small play-
ers increases error).
• No large player can go to π(S, 1): this would increase the
error of the small players.
• No large player wishes to go to π(0, 2): this would in-
crease the error of both large players.
Next, we will consider the case where π(S, ℓ′)  π(S, 0):
in this case, we will show that π(S, ℓ) is individually stable.
• No small player wishes to go from π(S, ℓ′) to π(1, 0). We
can see that π(1, 0) has higher error because we know
π(S, ℓ′)  π(S, 0) ≻ π(1, 0).
• No small player wishes to go to π(1, 1). We can see
π(1, 1) has higher error for the small player because
π(S, ℓ′)  π(S, 1) ≻ π(1, 1). The first inequality comes
from the following reasoning: if d
dℓ
err0(π(S, ℓ)) is neg-
ative at ℓ = 1, then there is a monotonically increasing
path of error from ℓ′ to 1. If d
dℓ
err0(π(S, ℓ)) is posi-
tive at 1, then we know that π(S, 1) ≺ π(S, 0), whereas
π(S, ℓ′)  π(S, 0).
• No large player wishes to go to π(S, ℓ′+1): by definition
of ℓ′, it would get greater error than in π(0, 1).
• No large player wishes to go to π(0, 2) for the same rea-
son as above.
By this analysis, π(S, ℓ′) is individually stable.
Taken together, in this section we have shown that there
always exists a stable partition of players into coalitions in
the case where players come in two sizes. In the next section,
we will consider other models of federation.
7 Other federation models
In the previous sections, we analyzed one type of federated
learning: when the global model is produced by taking the
weighted average of the parameters each player calculates
on their own data:
θˆf =
1∑M
i=1 ni
M∑
i=1
θˆi · ni
With this federation method, we saw in previous sections
that it is frequently the case that the situation where all
players are federating together (πg) is not stable. It might
seem natural to investigate whether an alternate weighting
mechanism might produce a stable πg coalition structure. In
this section, we investigate two alternate federating meth-
ods, both implemented in the mean-estimation case. These
types of methods combine the global model with the local
model: in this way, they can be seen as analogues to some
kind of transfer learning.
All proofs are in Appendix D. Appendix A has a discus-
sion of how this approach relates to other approaches re-
lated to combining data, such as Bayesian estimation and
the James-Stein estimator.
w-weighting
In this case, each player has a parameter wj that it uses to
weight the global model with its own local model.
θˆwj = wj · θˆj + (1 − wj) ·
1
N
M∑
i=1
θˆi · ni
for w ∈ [0, 1]. Note that wj = 0 corresponds to our old no-
tation of federated learning (which we will refer to as “pure
federation”) and wj = 1 corresponds to pure local learning.
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It is possible to derive analogous error values for this sit-
uation:
Lemma 7.1. For w−weighting federated learning, the ex-
pected MSE of a player with nj samples is:
µe
(
w2
nj
+
1− w2
N
)
+
∑
i6=j n
2
i + (N − nj)
2
N2
·(1−w)2σ2
We are also able to reason about the optimal wj parame-
ter. The lemma below tells us that each player would prefer
federation, in some form, to being alone.
Lemma 7.2. The minimum error is always achieved when
wj < 1, implying that federation is always preferable to
local learning.
However, there are two potential shortfalls of the wj
method. The first is that, for a player j in a coalition, in-
creasing ni for i 6= j can increase player j’s error. This is
unfortunate because it means players are hurt when more
samples are made available, even though having more sam-
ples improves overall knowledge of the parameters. For ex-
ample, for µe = 10, σ
2 = 1, consider two cases: one with
a coalition of 4 players, each with ns = 30, and one with
a coalition of 3 players with ns = 30 and one player with
ns = 300. In the first case, a small player has expected error
0.271, in the second case, 0.280.
The second shortfall is that, in some cases, πg is not core-
stable. We can refer to the same example: the small player
in a coalition with only the 3 small players would get error
0.278, which is less than the error it would get in πg . In this
situation, πg is not core-stable. The next section will explore
a model that alleviates these drawbacks.
v-matrix
In this case, the federated estimate differs for each player
and is:
θˆvj =
M∑
i=1
vjiθi
for
∑M
i=1 vji = 1. vj is a length M vector that denotes
the weight player j places on data taken from each of the
players. Note that we can recover the w weighting case with
vjj = w +
(1−w)·nj
N
and vji = (1− w) ·
ni
N
.
We can again derive expected error values:
Lemma 7.3. For mean estimation with the v-weighting fed-
erated learning method, the expected MSE of a player with
nj samples is:
µe
M∑
i=1
v2ji
ni
+

∑
i6=j
v2ji +

∑
i6=j
vji


2

 · σ2
Similarly, we can calculate the optimal v weights for
player j’s error rate.
Lemma 7.4. Define Vi = σ
2 + µe
ni
. Then, the value of {vji}
that minimizes player j’s error is:
vjj =
1 + σ2
∑
i6=j
1
Vi
1 + Vj
∑
i6=j
1
Vi
and
vjk =
1
Vk
·
Vj − σ2
1 + Vj
∑
i6=j
1
Vi
From this analysis, a few properties become clear. To start
with, vjj and vjk are always strictly between 0 and 1. This
implies the following lemma:
Corollary 7.5. With v weights set optimally, πg is optimal
for each player.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that some other coalition
π′ gave player j a lower error. WLOG, assume this coali-
tion omitted player k. In this case, the v weights for π′ can
be represented as a lengthM vector with 0 in the kth entry.
However, set of weights is achievable in πg: it is always an
option to set a player’s coefficient vjk equal to 0. This con-
tradicts the use of vj as an optimal weighting, so it cannot
be the case that any player gets lower error in a different
coalition.
Similarly, the fact that πg is optimal for every player im-
plies that it is in the core, and that it is the only element in
the core.
8 Conclusions and future directions
In this work, we have drawn a connection between a simple
model of federated learning and the game theoretic tool of
hedonic games. We used this tool to examine stable parti-
tions of the space for two variants of the game. In service
of this analysis, we computed exact error values for mean
estimation and linear regression. Finally, we proposed and
analyzed two other variants of federated learning that incen-
tivize the formation of larger coalitions.
We believe that this framework is a simple and useful
tool for analyzing the incentives of multiple self-interested
agents in a learning environment. There are many fascinat-
ing extensions. For example, completely characterizing the
core (including whether it is always non-empty) in the case
of arbitrary number of samples {ni} is an obvious area of in-
vestigation. Besides this, it could be interesting to compute
exact or approximate error values for cases beyond mean es-
timation and linear regression.
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A Relationship to other approaches
This section contains a high-level summary of similar ap-
proaches and how they relate to ours. Throughout we as-
sume the goal is to estimate some unknown θj given samples
drawn Yi ∼ D(θj).
A frequentist approach would take θi to be a constant
that would be estimated by the average of the given samples
1
nj
∑
i=1 Yi.
A hierarchical Bayesian estimator assumes data is gen-
erated in the following way: data is drawn Yi ∼ D(Y |θi).
The parameter θi is drawn θi ∼ Θi(θ|λi), where hyperpa-
rameter λi is drawn from known distribution p(λ). Given
some data, the parameter θi can be estimated as follows
p(θi|Yi) =
p(Yi|θi)p(θi)
p(Yi)
=
p(Yi|θi)
p(Yi)
∫
p(θi|λi)p(λi)dλ
Parametric empirical Bayes (Morris 1986) (Casella
1992) is frequently described as an intermediate between
these two viewpoints. Similar to the hierarchical Bayesian
viewpoint, it assumes data is drawn Yi ∼ D(Y |θi), with pa-
rameter θi is drawn θi ∼ Θi(θ|λi). However, it differs in
that it estimates λi based on the data, producing λˆi. This es-
timate of the hyperparameter is used, along with the data, to
estimate θi.
A related example is the James-Stein estimator
(Efron and Morris 1977). The estimator assumes the follow-
ing process: each of m players draws a single sample from
a normal distribution with variance s2.
Yi ∼ N (θi, s
2)
This is different from the empirical Bayes or Bayes case in
that it is assumed that the means θi are completely unrelated
to each other. Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated that the
James-Stein estimator:
θˆJS =
(
1−
(m− 2) · s2
‖Y‖2
)
Y
has lower expected MSE than simply using the drawn pa-
rameters Yi. In the case that the variance s
2 is not known
perfectly, it can be estimated as sˆ2 using entire vector of
dataY.
Our method is similar at a high level to empirical Bayes:
we assume each player draws data from a personal distribu-
tion governed by θi and that the θi terms are in turn drawn
from some distribution Θ. However, one key difference is
that all three methods discussed above assume knowledge of
the distributions generating the data, or at least which family
they are drawn from. For example, the James Stein estimator
assumes a normal distribution: variants of it exist for differ-
ent distributions, but not a version that works for all distri-
butions. Similarly, a hierarchical Bayes or empirical Bayes
viewpoint would require knowledge of the D,Θ, p distribu-
tions. In our approach, we do not assume that we know the
form of these generating distributions, only some summary
values summary statistics (mean and variance) of the distri-
bution.
It is entirely possible that other approaches, especially
those that assume knowledge of the generating distribution,
will out-perform our approach in terms of the error guaran-
tees they can provide. Our distribution-free approach allows
it to be implemented in a broader range of situations.
Additionally, our approach is restricted to linear combina-
tions of estimators such as θˆf = w · θˆj+(1−w)
∑M
i=1 θˆi. It
is possible that a method outside this situation, for example,
something like θˆf = x · θˆj + y
∑M
i=1 θˆ
2
i , or something like
the non-linear James Stein estimator, would produce better
estimates.
B Expected error proofs
Mean estimation
Assume that that player j ∈ [M ] draws parameters i.i.d
(θj , ǫ
2
j) ∼ Θ. Then, that player draws ni i.i.d samples
Y ∼ Dj(θj , ǫ2j), where θj is the true mean of their personal
distribution Θj and ǫ
2
j is the true variance of that distribu-
tion. The player can either choose to use local estimation,
which corresponds to:
θˆlj =
1
nj
nj∑
i=1
Yij
or federation, which corresponds to:
θˆf =
1
N
M∑
i=1
θˆli · ni
where N =
∑M
i=1 ni. We’re interested in the expected
mean squared error of each different estimator. Note that
there are two separate expectations taken over two sepa-
rate quantities of randomness. One is randomness in draws,
EY∼D(θj,ǫ2j)
, and one is randomness over the parameter
drawing, E(θj ,ǫ2j)∼Θ.
Lemma 4.1. For mean estimation, the expected MSE of lo-
cal estimation for a player with nj samples is
µe
nj
.
Proof. First, we apply expectation over data draws:
EY∼D(θj,ǫ2j)
[
(θj − θˆ
l
j)
2
]
= V ar(θˆlj)
= V ar
(
1
nj
nj∑
i=1
Yij
)
=
1
n2j
· nj · ǫ
2
j =
ǫ2j
nj
where we have used variance properties to simplify the term.
Next, we take the expectation over parameter draws:
E(θj ,ǫ2j)∼Θ
[
ǫ2j
nj
]
=
µe
nj
Lemma 4.2. For mean estimation, the expected MSE of fed-
erated estimation for a player with nj samples is
µe
N
+
∑
i6=j n
2
i + (N − nj)
2
N2
σ2
where N =
∑M
i=1 ni.
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Proof. Here, the quantity we are interested in is:(
θˆf − θj
)2
=
(
θˆf − θf + θf − θj
)2
= (θˆf − θf )2 + (θf − θj) + 2(θˆ
f − θf ) · (θf − θj)
First, we apply the expectation over data draws for each
term. First, we note that the last term is 0:
EY∼D(θj,ǫ2j)
[
2(θˆf − θf ) · (θf − θj)
]
= 0
Next, we look at the first term:
EY∼D(θj,ǫ2j)
[
(θˆf − θf )2
]
= V ar(θˆf )
= V ar
(
1
N
M∑
i=1
θˆlj · nj
)
=
1
N2
·
(
M∑
i=1
V ar(θˆlj) · n
2
i
)
=
1
N2
(
M∑
i=1
ǫ2i · ni
)
where we have used V ar(θˆli) =
ǫ2i
ni
in the last step. Next, we
take the expectation over the parameter draws:
E(θj ,ǫ2j)∼Θ
[
1
N2
(
M∑
i=1
ǫ2i · ni
)]
=
∑M
i=1 ni
N2
E(θj ,ǫ2j)∼Θ
[ǫ2i ] =
µe
N
Finally, we look at the middle term. First, we rewrite:
(
θf − θj
)2
=
(
1
N
M∑
i=1
ni · θi − θj
)2
=

 1
N
∑
i6=j
niθi −
N − nj
N
θj


2
=
1
N2

∑
i6=j
ni · θi


2
+
(N − nj)2
N2
θ2j
−2
∑
i6=j
(N − nj)ni
N2
θiθj
We can rewrite the first term as:
1
N2

∑
i6=j
n2i · θ
2
i

+ 1
N2
∑
i,k 6=j,i6=k
ni · nk · θi · θk
Note that we only have one source of randomness in
this case: that of parameter draws from the distribution,
E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ
. Taking the expectation with respect to this pro-
duces two distinct terms: E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ[θ
2
i ] andE(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ[θi]
2.
First, we collect all terms involving E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ[θ
2
i ] to get:
E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ
[θ2i ]
N2

∑
i6=j
n2i + (N − nj)
2


Collecting terms with a E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ[θi]
2 coefficient gives:
E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ
[θi]
2
N2

 ∑
i,k 6=j,i6=k
ni · nk − 2
∑
i6=j
(N − nj) · ni


Note that
(N − nj)
2 =
∑
i6=j
n2i +
∑
i,k 6=j,k 6=i
ni · nk
Substituting and rearranging the term inside the parentheses
gives us:
(N − nj)
2 −
∑
i6=j
n2i − 2
∑
i6=j
(N − nj) · ni
= −
∑
i6=j
n2i + (N − nj) · (N − nj − 2
∑
i6=j
ni)
= −
∑
i6=j
n2i + (N − nj) · (N − nj − 2(N − nj))
= −
∑
i6=j
n2i − (N − nj)
2
So the overall coefficient becomes:
−
E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ
[θi]
2
N2

∑
i6=j
n2i + (N − nj)
2


We can combine the E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ[θi]
2 and E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ[θ
2
i ]
terms because they share a common coefficient, giving us:∑
i6=j n
2
i + (N − nj)
2
N2
(
E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ
[θ2i ]− E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ[θi]
2
)
=
∑
i6=j n
2
i + (N − nj)
2
N2
σ2
where we have used σ2 = V ar(θj) = E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ[θ
2
i ] −
E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ
[θi]
2. The overall federated error becomes:
µe
N
+
∑
i6=j n
2
i + (N − nj)
2
N2
σ2
Linear regression
In this setting, we assume that each player j ∈ [M ] draws
parameters (θj , ǫ
2
j) ∼ Θ, where θj is a length D vector
and ǫ2j is a scalar-valued variance parameter as before. The
dth entry in the vector is θdj , and V ar(θ
d
j ) = σ
2
d. We as-
sume that each value θj is drawn independently of the oth-
ers. The main result of this section will assume that each
dimension is drawn independently, for example that θlj is
independent of θkj , for k 6= l, but will we will demonstrate
how this can be relaxed. Each player draws nj input data-
points from their own input distribution,Xj ∼ Xj such that
Ex∼Xj [x
Tx] = Σj : we assume that the input dimensions
are continuous and may be correlated but not deterministic
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functions of each other. They then noisily observes the out-
puts, drawing Yj ∼ Dj(XTj θj, ǫ
2
j). We use ηj to denote the
length D vector of errors so that Yj = X
T
j θj + ηj . Each
player uses ordinary least squares (OLS) to compute esti-
mates of their parameters: We assume that XTj X is invert-
ible. This happens when the columns ofX are linearly inde-
pendent: whenX is continuous and the columns aren’t de-
terministic functions of each other, this happens with proba-
bility 1.
θˆj = (X
T
j Xj)
−1Yj = (X
T
j Xj)
−1(Xjθj + ηj)
Using the above value results in local estimation, where fed-
eration would correspond to:
θˆ
f
j =
1
N
M∑
i=1
θˆi · ni
The expected error that a set of estimates θˆ is determined by
the expectation of the following quantity.
(xT θˆ − xTθj)
2
Here, the expectation is taken over four sources of random-
ness.
1. Ex∼Xj : Drawing a new test point x from the data distri-
bution Xj
2. EYi∼Di(XTi θi,ǫ
2
i
): Drawing labels for the datasetXi from
the distribution Di(XTi θi, ǫ
2
i ).
3. EXi∼Xi : Drawing the dataset Xi from data distribution
Xi
4. E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ: Drawing parameters θj, ǫ
2
j for player j’s dis-
tribution from Θ.
(xT θˆ − xTθj)2 measures the expected error of a set of pa-
rameters at a particular point x: when the expectation is
taken over all x ∼ Xj , it represents the average error ev-
erywhere on the distribution. It might be not immediately
clear, though, why (xT θˆ − xTθj)
2 is the correct term to be
considering. Other potential candidates might include:
1.
∥∥∥θˆj − θj∥∥∥2
2. (xT θˆj − y)2 for y = xTθj + ηj .
The first candidate measures the difference in estimated pa-
rameters; however, we assume that the objective of learning
is to have low error on predicting future points, rather than
solely estimate the parameters. The second candidate rep-
resents the error of predicting an instance as opposed to a
mean value: it ends up simply producing an additive increase
in our overall error term. To see this, note that we can write
(xT θˆj − y)
2 = (xT θˆj − x
Tθj + x
Tθj − y)
2
= (xT θˆj − x
Tθj + x
Tθj − x
Tθj + ηj)
2
= (xT θˆj − x
Tθj + ηj)
2
= (xT θˆj − x
Tθj)
2 + 2((xT θˆj − x
Tθj)ηj + η
2
j
The first term is the same error function we are considering.
The middle term is 0 in expectation and the last term is µe
in expectation, so this approach simply scales the error we
were looking at by µe.
Lemma 4.3. For linear regression, the expected MSE of lo-
cal estimation for a player with nj samples is
µe · tr
[
ΣjEXj∼Xj
[(
XTj Xj
)−1]]
If the distribution of input values Xj is a D-dimensional
multivariate normal distribution with 0 mean, then, the ex-
pected MSE of local estimation can be simplified to:
µe
nj −D − 2
D
Note: portions of Abu-Mostafa, Lin, and Magdon-Ismail
(2012) and Paquay (2018), especially problem 3.11, were
helpful in formulating this approach. Sellentin and Heavens
(2015) and Anderson (1962) were helpful in providing the
connection to the Inverse Wishart.
Proof. First, note that:
xTθj − x
T θˆj = x
T
(
θj − (X
T
j Xj)
−1XTj Yj
)
= xT
(
θj − (X
T
j Xj)
−1XTj (Xjθj + ηj)
)
= xT
(
θj − θj − (X
T
j Xj)
−1XTj ηj
)
= −xT (XTj Xj)
−1XTj ηj
Then,
(xTθj − x
T θˆj)
2
= ηTj Xj(X
T
j X)
−1xxT (XTj Xj)
−1XTj ηj
To simplify this, we note that the above quantity is a scalar.
For a scalar, a = tr(a), and for any matrix, tr(AB) =
tr(BA) through the cyclic property of the scalar.
= tr
[
ηTj Xj(X
T
j X)
−1xxT (XTj Xj)
−1XTj ηj
]
= tr
[
xxT (XTj Xj)
−1XTj ηjη
T
j Xj(X
T
j X)
−1
]
To evaluate this, we start by applying the various expecta-
tions, noting that expectation and trace commute. Applying
Eηj∼Dj(0,ǫ2j)
to the term above allows us to rewrite it as:
= tr
[
xxT (XTj Xj)
−1XTj VXj(X
T
j X)
−1
]
where
V = Eηj∼Dj(0,ǫ2j)[ηjη
T
j ]
ηjη
T
j is an nj ×nj matrix. The lth diagonal is (η
l
j)
2, which
has expectation ǫ2j . Off diagonal entries have value η
l
j · η
k
j
for ℓ 6= k. Because the errors for each data point are drawn
independently and with 0 mean, the expectation of this is 0.
Eηj∼Dj(0,ǫ2j)
[ηjη
T
j ] is a diagonal matrix with ǫ
2
j along the
diagonal: we can pull it out of the trace to obtain:
= ǫ2j tr
[
xxT (XTj Xj)
−1XTj Xj(X
T
j X)
−1
]
= ǫ2j tr
[
xxT (XTj Xj)
−1
]
Taking the expectation over the drawn parameters gives:
= E(θj ,ǫ2j)∼Θ[ǫ
2
j tr
[
xxT (XTj Xj)
−1
]
]
= µetr
[
xxT (XTj Xj)
−1
]
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Taking the expectation over x ∼ Xj gives:
= µetr
[
Ex∼Xj [xx
T ](XTj Xj)
−1
]
= µetr
[
Σj(X
T
j Xj)
−1
]
Finally, we take the expectation with respect toXj ∼ Xj
= µetr
[
ΣjEXj∼Xj
[(
XTj Xj
)−1]]
Note that because the inverse and expectation do not com-
mute, in general, we cannot simplify this without stronger
assumptions.
There is one other situation where a particular case of lin-
ear regression gives us simpler results. As mentioned in the
statement of the lemma, in this case we assume that the dis-
tribution of input values Xj is a 0-mean normal distribution
with covariance matrix Covj .
Note that, in general, Covj 6= Σj = Ex∼Xj [xx
T ].
Ex∼Xj [xx
T ] has, along the diagonals, Ex∼Xj [x
d
jx
d
j ], and
on the off-diagonals, has Ex∼Xj [x
l
jx
k
j ]. By contrast, the
covariance matrix has the same term along the diag-
onals, but the off-diagonal term has Ex∼Xj [x
l
jx
k
j ] −
Ex∼Xj [x
l
j]Ex∼Xj [x
k
j ]. In the case we are looking at, the dis-
tribution is 0 mean, so the off-diagonal terms match as well,
and Covj = Σj .
If this is the case, then (XTj Xj)
−1 is distributed accord-
ing to an InverseWishart distributionwith parametersnj−1,
D, and covariance Covj = Σj . An unbiased estimator of
Covj is found by using
1
nj−1
XTj Xj , and the property of
the inverse Wishart tells us that:
EXj∼Xj
[(
1
nj − 1
XTj Xj
)−1]
=
nj − 1
nj −D − 2
Cov−1j
Using these results, we can directly calculate the desired ex-
pectation:
µetr
[
ΣjEXj∼Xj
[(
XTj Xj
)−1]]
=
µe
nj − 1
tr
[
ΣjEXj∼Xj
[(
1
nj − 1
XTj Xj
)−1]]
=
µe
nj − 1
tr
[
Σj
nj − 1
nj −D − 2
Cov−1j
]
=
µe
nj − 1
tr
[
Σj
nj − 1
nj −D − 2
Σ−1j
]
=
µe
nj −D − 2
tr [ID]
=
µe
nj −D − 2
D
Note that we can reduce the linear regression case to
mean estimation. In this case, assume a 1-dimensional in-
put with x = 1 deterministically. After drawing xj , we mul-
tiply it by θj and add some noise governed by ǫ
2
j : this is
the exact same structure as mean estimation. In this case,
Σj = EXj∼Xj [X
2
j ] + V ar(Xj) = 1 + 0 = 1. Similarly,
XTj Xj = nj deterministically, so the error term reduces to
µe
nj
as before.
Note that, as expected, this does not simplify down to the
mean estimation case for D = 1: that case would model a
version of 1-dimensional linear regression, where it is nec-
essary to estimate both θ as well as xˆ, the mean of the input
distribution.
Lemma 4.4. For linear regression, the expectedMSE of fed-
erated estimation for a player with nj samples is:
Lj +
∑
i6=j n
2
i + (N − nj)
2
N2
D∑
d=1
Ex∼Xj [(x
d)2] · σ2d
where Lj is equal to:
µe
M∑
i=1
n2i
N2
tr[ΣjEY∼D(θi,ǫ2i )
[
(XTi Xi)
−1
]
or, if the distribution of input values Xi isa D-dimensional
multivariate normal distribution with 0 mean, can be simpli-
fied to
µe
M∑
i=1
n2i
N2
D
ni −D − 2
Proof. Here, we will use EY∼D(θi,ǫ2i )
to mean the expecta-
tion taken over all i ∈ [M ] player’s data, given that all of the
data influences the federated learning result.
(xTθj − x
T θˆf)2
= (xTθj − x
Tθf + xTθf − xT θˆf)2
= (xTθj − x
Tθf)2 + (xTθf − xT θˆf)2
+2(xTθj − x
Tθf ) · (xTθf − xT θˆf)
Note that the expectation of the last term results in 0 because
EY∼D(θj,ǫ2j)
[
xTθf − xT θˆf
]
= 0. Next, we investigate the
second equation in the sum.
(xTθf − xT θˆf )2
=
(
xT
M∑
i=1
ni
N
θi − x
T
M∑
i=1
θˆi
)2
=
(
M∑
i=1
ni
N
xT (θi − θˆi)
)2
Expanding out the squared term gives us:
M∑
i=1
(ni
N
xT (θi − θˆi)
)2
+
M∑
i=1
∑
k 6=i
(ni
N
xT (θi − θˆi) ·
nk
N
xT (θk − θˆk)
)
The second term ends up being relevant: because each set
of parameters θi ∼ Θ are drawn independently and because
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each data setXi ∼ Xi are drawn independently, the θi − θˆi
terms are independent of each other. Because each is 0 in
expectation, the entire product has expectation 0. Applying
the expectation to the first term and rewriting gives:
M∑
i=1
n2i
N2
(xTθi − x
T θˆi)
2
The term inside the sum is exactly equivalent to the value we
solved with the local estimation case: we can rewrite this as
µe
M∑
i=1
n2i
N2
tr[ΣjEY∼D(θi,ǫ2i )
[
(XTi Xi)
−1
]
or, if the necessary conditions are satisfied,
µe
M∑
i=1
n2i
N2
D
ni −D − 2
Finally, we will explore the first term in the sum:
(xTθj − x
Tθf)2
= (xT (θj − θ
f))TxT (θj − θ
f )
= (θj − θ
f)TxxT (θj − θ
f)
Taking the expectation and using the cyclic property of the
trace gives:
= tr
[
(θj − θ
f )TEx∼Xj [xx
T ](θj − θ
f)
]
= tr
[
Σj(θj − θ
f)(θj − θ
f)T
]
Next, we focus on simplifying the term involving the θ val-
ues. Using the definition of θf gives:
N − nj
N
θj −
∑
i6=j
ni
N
θi



N − nj
N
θj −
∑
i6=j
ni
N
θi


T
Expanding and taking the expectation gives us three terms.
The first: (
N − nj
N
)2
Eθj∼Θ
[
θjθ
T
j
]
=
1
N2

∑
i6=j
n2i +
∑
i,k 6=j,k 6=i
ni · nk

Eθj∼Θ [θjθTj ]
The second:
−2
∑
i6=j
N − nj
N
ni
N
Eθi,θj∼Θ
[
θjθ
T
i
]
= −2
(
N − nj
N
)2
Eθi,θj∼Θ
[
θjθ
T
i
]
= −2
1
N2

∑
i6=j
n2i +
∑
i,k 6=j,k 6=i
ni · nk

Eθi,θj∼Θ [θjθTi ]
And the third:
Eθi∼Θ



∑
i6=j
ni
N
θi



∑
i6=j
ni
N
θi


T


=
∑
i6=j
(ni
N
)2
Eθj∼Θ
[
θjθ
T
j
]
+
∑
i,k 6=j,k 6=i
ni · nk
N2
Eθi,θk∼Θ
[
θkθ
T
i
]
If we combine all three terms and collect coefficients, we
get:
1
N2
∑
i6=j
n2i
(
2Eθj∼Θ
[
θjθ
T
j
]
− 2Eθi,θj∼Θ
[
θjθ
T
i
])
+
1
N2
∑
i,k 6=j,k 6=i
ni ·nk
(
Eθj∼Θ
[
θjθ
T
j
]
− Eθi,θj∼Θ
[
θjθ
T
i
])
=
(
Eθj∼Θ
[
θjθ
T
j
]
− Eθi,θj∼Θ
[
θjθ
T
i
])
·
1
N2

2∑
i6=j
n2i +
1
N2
∑
i,k 6=j,k 6=i
ni · nk


=
(
Eθj∼Θ
[
θjθ
T
j
]
− Eθi,θj∼Θ
[
θjθ
T
i
])
·
1
N2

∑
i6=j
n2i + (N − nj)
2


We can recombine this term with the component involving
the trace to rewrite it as:
tr
[
Σj
(
Eθj∼Θ
[
θjθ
T
j
]
− Eθi,θj∼Θ
[
θjθ
T
i
])]
·
1
N2

∑
i6=j
n2i + (N − nj)
2


Next, we need to reason about the difference in the ex-
pected terms. In this setting, we are assuming that each
coefficient is drawn separately from the other coefficients.
Eθj∼Θ
[
θjθ
T
j
]
has, on the dth element of the diagonal,
Eθj∼Θ[(θ
d
j )
2] and on the off-diagonal terms in the l, kth en-
try, has Eθj∼Θ[θ
l
j · θ
k
j ] Here, we are assuming that θ
l
j and
θkj are independent, so this equals Eθj∼Θ[θ
l
j] · Eθj∼Θ[θ
k
j ]:
we relax this assumption below. Eθi,θj∼Θ
[
θjθ
T
i
]
has, on
the dth element of the diagonal, Eθj∼Θ[(θ
d
j )]
2, and on the
l, kth off-diagonal term has the same value as the other ma-
trix: Eθj∼Θ[θ
l
j ] · Eθj∼Θ[θ
k
j ]. The difference between these
two matrices is a diagonal matrix with Eθj∼Θ[(θ
d
j )
2] −
Eθj∼Θ[(θ
d
j )]
2 = σ2d on the diagonal, where σ
2
d represents
the variance of the dth coefficient. That turns the term in-
volving the trace into a simple sum:∑
i6=j n
2
i + (N − nj)
2
N2
D∑
d=1
Ex∼Xj [(x
d)2] · σ2d
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In the proof above, we assumed that the draw of parame-
ter value θlj is independent of θ
k
j , for l 6= k. A case where
this might not occur is when these values are correlated: say,
the value drawn for θlj is anti-correlated with the parameter
drawn for θkj . (Note that we still assume draws are indepen-
dent across players: θlj is independent of θ
l
i and θ
k
i ). Relax-
ing this assumption is not hard and would change the results
in the following way: the off-diagonal terms of the differ-
ence would no longer be 0. Instead, the off-diagonal l, kth
entry becomes
Eθj∼Θ[θ
l
j · θ
k
j ]− Eθj∼Θ[θ
l
j ] · Eθj∼Θ[θ
k
j ]
Performing the matrix multiplication with Σj turns this into:
D∑
d=1
Ex∼Xj [(x
d)2] · σ2d +
∑
l 6=d
Ex∼Xj [x
d · xl]
·(Eθj∼Θ[θ
l
j · θ
k
j ]− Eθj∼Θ[θ
l
j ] · Eθj∼Θ[θ
k
j ])
Our final value for this component of the error would be the
same form, but with a slightly different coefficient.
C Supporting lemmas for strict federation
case
Lemma 6.1. If ni >
µe
σ2
for all i ∈ [M ], then πl is the
unique element in the core.
Proof. We will show this by showing that every player min-
imizes their error by being alone in πl. We will use NQ to
be the sum of elements within a coalitionQ. Q could be the
coalition equal to all players (πg) or some strict subset, but
we will assume it contains at least 2 elements. We will show
that every player gets higher error in Q than it would get
alone. We wish to show:
µe
NQ
+ σ2
∑
i6=j,i∈Q n
2
i + (NQ − nj)
2
N2Q
>
µe
nj
Cross multiplying gives:
µe·NQ·nj+σ
2·nj ·

 ∑
i6=j,i∈Q
n2i + (NQ − nj)
2

 > µe·N2Q
Rewriting:
σ2·nj ·

 ∑
i6=j,i∈Q
n2i + (NQ − nj)
2

 > µe·N2Q−µe·NQ·nj
The righthand side can be rewritten as:
µe ·N
2
Q−µe ·NQ ·nj = µe ·(NQ−nj)
2+µe ·nj ·(NQ−nj)
Then, we can prove the inequality by splitting it up into two
terms. The first:
σ2 · nj · (NQ − nj)
2 > µe · (NQ − nj)
2
which is true because nj · σ2 > µe. The second:
σ2 · nj ·
∑
i6=j,i∈Q
n2i > µe · nj · (NQ − nj)
σ2 ·
∑
i6=j,i∈Q
n2i > µe ·
∑
i6=j,i∈Q
ni
which is satisfied because, for each player,
σ2 · n2i > µe · ni
because σ2 · ni > µe.
Lemma 6.2. If ni ≥
µe
σ2
for all i ∈ [M ], with nk >
µe
σ2
for at
least one player k, then any arrangement where the players
with samples nk >
µe
σ2
are alone is in the core.
Proof. To prove this, we can note that, in the proof above,
any coalition Q with at least one player ni >
µe
σ2
would
satisfy the desired inequality: all players participating would
get higher error than they could alone. This shows that any
coalition involving a player with more samples than µe
σ2
is
infeasible. We have previously shown that all players with
ni =
µe
σ2
get equal error no matter their arrangement.
Lemma 6.3. If ns ≤
µe
σ2
and ns < nℓ, a small player in
a coalition with s small players and ℓ large players always
prefers s as large as possible:
s2 > s1 ⇒ π(s2, ℓ) ≻0 π(s1, ℓ)
Proof. To prove this, we will show that the derivative of the
small player’s error with respect to s is always negative. The
error is:
µe
s · ns + ℓ · nℓ
+σ2
(s− 1) · n2s + ℓ · n
2
ℓ + ((s− 1) · ns + ℓ · nl)
2
(s · ns + ℓ · nℓ)2
The derivative with respect to s is:
ns · (s · ns · (ns · σ2 − µe))
(s · ns + ℓ · nl)3
−
ns · (ℓ · nℓ · (µe + 2nℓ · σ2 − 3ns · σ2))
(s · ns + ℓ · nl)3
Showing that the derivative is negative is equivalent to show-
ing that the term below is negative:
s · ns · (ns · σ
2 − µe)− ℓ · nℓ · (µe + 2nℓ · σ
2 − 3ns · σ
2)
We can break this term into multiple components:
s · ns · (ns · σ
2 − µe) ≤ 0
because ns ≤
µe
σ2
. We can rewrite a second term as:
µe − ns · σ
2 + 2σ2(nℓ − ns)
We know that µe − ns · σ2 ≥ 0, and because nℓ > ns,
2nℓ · σ
2 − 2ns · σ
2 > 0
These facts, taken together, show that the derivative is al-
ways negative.
Lemma 6.4. If nℓ ≥
µe
σ2
and ns < nℓ, a large player in
a coalition with s small players and ℓ large players always
prefers ℓ as small as possible:
ℓ2 < ℓ1 ⇒ π(s, ℓ2) ≻1 π(s, ℓ2)
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Proof. To prove this, we will show that the derivative of the
large player’s error with respect to ℓ is always positive. The
error is:
µe
s · ns + ℓ · nℓ
+σ2
s · n2s + (ℓ− 1) · n
2
ℓ + (s · ns + (ℓ − 1) · nℓ)
2
(s · ns + ℓ · nℓ)2
The derivative with respect to ℓ is:
nℓ(ℓ · nℓ(nℓσ2 − µe)− ns · s(µe − 3nℓ · σ2 + 2ns · σ2))
(ℓ · nℓ + ns · s)3
We wish to show that the numerator is positive. We can
break it into multiple components:
nℓ · σ
2 − µe ≥ 0
because nℓ ≥
µe
σ2
. We can rewrite the second term as
µe − nℓ · σ
2 + 2σ2(ns − nℓ)
which is negative because nℓ ≥
µe
σ2
and nℓ > ns.
Lemma 6.5. Assume ns ≤
µe
σ2
and ns < nℓ. If nℓ ≤
µe
σ2
, a
small player in a coalition with s small players and ℓ large
players always prefers ℓ as large as possible. If nℓ >
µe
σ2
,
as ℓ is increased, the small player’s error first increases and
then decreases: the player achieves a maximum error, and
then overall error decreases with ℓ.
Proof. The small player’s error is
µe
s · ns + ℓ · nℓ
+σ2
(s− 1) · n2s + ℓ · n
2
ℓ + ((s− 1) · ns + ℓ · nl)
2
(s · ns + ℓ · nℓ)2
The derivative with respect to ℓ is:
−
nℓ · (ℓ · nℓ · (µe − σ2 · ns + σ2(nℓ − ns))
(ℓ · nℓ + s · ns)3
−
nℓ · (s · ns · (µe − nℓ · σ
2)
(ℓ · nℓ + s · ns)3
The derivative is negative when the term below is positive:
ℓ · nℓ · (µe − σ
2 ·ns+ σ
2(nℓ−ns)) + s · ns · (µe −nℓ · σ
2)
The first term (multiplying ℓ · nℓ) is always positive. For
nℓ ≤
µe
σ2
the second term is also positive or zero, so the
derivative is always negative.
If nℓ >
µe
σ2
, then the term starts out as positive and (as ℓ
increases) becomes more smaller, eventually becoming neg-
ative and staying negative. This means that the derivative
starts out as negative and (as ℓincreases) becomes larger and
larger, eventually becoming and staying positive.
Lemma 6.6. Assume ns ≤
µe
σ2
, nℓ ≥
µe
σ2
, and ns < nℓ. As
s is increased, the large player’s error first decreases and
then increases: the large player achieves a minimum level of
error, and afterwards its error increases with s.
Proof. The large player’s error is:
µe
s · ns + ℓ · nℓ
+σ2
s · n2s + (ℓ− 1) · n
2
ℓ + (s · ns + (ℓ − 1) · nl)
2
(s · ns + ℓ · nℓ)2
The derivative with respect to s is:
−
ns · (ℓ · nℓ(µe − ns · σ2))
(ℓ · nℓ + s · ns)3
−
ns · (ns · s · (µe − nℓ · σ2 + σ2(ns − nℓ)))
(ℓ · nℓ + s · ns)3
The derivative is negative when the term below is positive:
ℓ · nℓ(µe − ns · σ
2) + ns · s · (µe − nℓ · σ
2 + σ2(ns − nℓ))
The first term is always positive or zero. The second term is
always negative. As s increases, the overall sum starts out
as positive, and then becomes negative. This means that the
derivative starts out as negative and then becomes positive:
the large player achieves a minimum amount of error, and
then overall error increases with s.
Theorem 6.7. If nℓ ≤
µe
σ2
and ns < nℓ, then the grand
coalition πg is core-stable.
Proof. As a reminder, the small players always prefer s as
large as possible, and for nℓ ≤
µe
σ2
they also prefer ℓ as
large as possible, so π(S,L) = πg minimizes error for
small players. For this reason, any defection coalition that
has π(s > 0, ℓ) is infeasible because the small players would
get higher error.
The only kind of defections we need to consider are in
the form π(0, ℓ). We will consider π(0, L) and show that the
large players prefer π(S,L) to π(0, L): π(S,L) ≻1 π(0, L).
In the case that nℓ <
µe
σ2
, π(0, L) ≻1 π(0, ℓ < L), so any
other arrangement is also not a possible defection. In the
case that nℓ <
µe
σ2
, π(0, L) =1 π(0, ℓ < L), so similarly any
other defection is not possible. What we’d like to show is:
µe
s · ns + ℓ · nℓ
+σ2
s · n2s + (ℓ− 1) · n
2
ℓ + (s · ns + (ℓ− 1) · nℓ)
2
(s · ns + ℓ · nℓ)2
<
µe
ℓ · nℓ
+ σ2
(ℓ − 1) · n2ℓ + (ℓ− 1)
2 · n2ℓ
ℓ2 · n2ℓ
Cross multiplying turns the condition into:
µe · (s · ns + ℓ · nℓ) · ℓ
2 · n2ℓ
+σ2 · (s ·n2s+(ℓ− 1) ·n
2
ℓ+(s ·ns+(ℓ− 1) ·nℓ)
2) · ℓ2 ·n2ℓ
< µe ·ℓ·nℓ ·(s·ns+ℓ·nℓ)
2+σ2 ·n2ℓ ·(ℓ−1)·ℓ·(ℓ·ns+ℓ·nℓ)
2
If we collect the µe terms, we get:
µe · ℓ · nℓ · (s · ns + ℓ · nℓ) · (s · ns + ℓ · nℓ − ℓ · nℓ)
= µe · ℓ · nℓ · (s · ns + ℓ · nℓ) · s · ns
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If we collect the σ2 terms, we get:
σ2 · ℓ · n2ℓ · (ℓv · (s · n
2
s + (ℓ− 1) · n
2
ℓ
+(s · ns + (ℓ − 1) · nℓ)
2)− (ℓ − 1) · (s · ns + ℓ · nℓ)
2)
First, we expand the first squared term and combine it with
another term:
s ·n2s+(ℓ−1) ·n
2
ℓ +s
2 ·n2s+2 ·s · (ℓ−1) ·nℓ+(ℓ−1)
2 ·n2ℓ
= n2s · s · (s+ 1) + 2 · s · (ℓ− 1) · ns · nℓ + n
2
ℓ · (ℓ− 1) · ℓ
Multiplied by ℓ, it becomes:
ℓ · (n2s · s · (s+ 1)+ 2 · s · (ℓ− 1) · ns · nℓ + n
2
ℓ · (ℓ− 1) · ℓ)
Expanding out the second squared term gives us:
s2 · n2s + 2s · ℓ · ns · nℓ + ℓ
2 · n2ℓ
When we multiply this by ℓ− 1, it becomes
−(ℓ− 1) · (s2 · n2s + 2s · ℓ · ns · nℓ + ℓ
2 · n2ℓ)
= −ℓ · (s2 · n2s + 2s · ℓ · ns · nℓ + ℓ
2 · n2ℓ)
+(s2 · n2s + 2s · ℓ · ns · nℓ + ℓ
2 · n2ℓ )
Next, we combine similar terms in both sums. First, we start
with coefficients of n2s
ℓ · n2s · s · (s+ 1)− (ℓ − 1) · n
2
s · s
2
= n2s · s · (ℓ · (s+ 1)− (ℓ − 1) · s)
= n2s · s · (ℓ · s+ ℓ− ℓ · s+ s)
= n2s · s · (ℓ+ s)
Next, we do the next term, which involves coefficients of
ns · nℓ:
ℓ · 2 · s · (ℓ− 1) · ns · nℓ − (ℓ − 1) · 2 · s · ℓ · ns · nℓ
= 0
And the last one term, with coefficients of n2ℓ :
ℓ2 · (ℓ− 1) · n2ℓ − (ℓ − 1) · ℓ
2 · n2ℓ
= 0
If we multiply by the terms we pulled out, it becomes:
n2s · s · (ℓ + s) · ℓ · n
2
ℓ · σ
2
Next, we return this to our inequality. What we’re trying to
show is:
ℓ ·n2ℓ ·n
2
s · s · (ℓ+ s) ·σ
2 < µe · ℓ ·nℓ · (s ·ns+ ℓ ·nℓ) · s ·ns
Cancelling some terms:
nℓ · ns · (ℓ + s) · σ
2 < µe · (s · ns + ℓ · nℓ)
Expanding out terms:
σ2 · (ℓ · nℓ · ns + s · nℓ · ns) < µe · (s · ns + ℓ · nℓ)
We can prove this by splitting up piecewise:
σ2 · ns · ℓ · nℓ < µe · ℓ · nℓ
because σ2 · ns < µe. Similarly,
σ2 · nℓ · s · ns < µe · s · ns
because σ2 · nℓ ≤ µe.
Lemma 6.9. Consider two coalitions π(s1, ℓ1) and
π(s2, ℓ2) with s2 < s1. Then, it is not possible to pick ℓ2
so that π(s1, ℓ1) ≻0 π(s2, ℓ2) and π(s1, ℓ1) ≻1 π(s2, ℓ2)
Proof. First, we consider a hypothetical ℓ′2 defined such that
s1 · ns + ℓ1 · nℓ = s2 · ns + ℓ
′
2 · nℓ
Note that ℓ2 may not be an integer: we’re using it as a refer-
ence tool (a hypothetical allocation) so this doesn’t matter.
First, we will show that the small player gets greater error
in this case. First, we rewrite it as:
ℓ′2 = (s1 − s2) ·
ns
nℓ
+ ℓ1
and plug it in to the equation for the error of a small player.
Note that most of the values stay the same: the entire µe term
and the denominator of the σ2 term. Similarly, note that with
the given substitution,
((s2 − 1) · ns + ℓ
′
2 · nℓ)
2 = ((s1 − 1) · ns + ℓ1 · nℓ)
2
The only term that changes is the other portion of the nu-
merator, which becomes:
n2ℓ · ℓ1 + ns · nℓ · (s1 − s2) + (s2 − 1) · n
2
s
We would like to show that it is larger than the relevant por-
tion of the error for π(s1, ℓ1), which is:
ℓ1 · n
2
ℓ + (s1 − 1) · n
2
s
This is equivalent to showing:
ns · nℓ · (s1 − s2) + (s2 − 1) · n
2
s > (s1 − 1) · n
2
s
We can lower bound the lefthand side using nℓ > ns:
ns ·nℓ ·(s1−s2)+(s2−1) ·n
2
s > n
2
s(s1−s2)+(s2−1) ·n
2
s
= n2s · (s1 − 1)
which shows that the small player gets greater error in
π(s2, ℓ
′
2) than in π(s1, ℓ1).
Next, we’ll show that the large player also gets greater
error. We will first note that from the definition of the errors
of the small and large players, we can write:
err0(s1, ℓ1) = err1(s1, ℓ1) + 2σ
2 nℓ − ns
ℓ1 · nℓ + s1 · ns
and
err0(s2, ℓ
′
2) = err1(s2, ℓ
′
2) + 2σ
2 nℓ − ns
ℓ′2 · nℓ + s2 · ns
Note that, by the definition of ℓ′2, the additive term for each
of these qualities is the same. We also have just shown that
err0(s2, ℓ
′
2) > err0(s1, ℓ1). From these two equalities, this
must imply that err1(s2, ℓ
′
2) > err1(s1, ℓ1).
We have shown that both the large and small players get
higher error in π(s2, ℓ
′
2) than π(s1, ℓ1). Next, we will show
that they have different preferences about whether they wish
ℓ′2 were larger or smaller, which means that no matter what
ℓ2 is, it will leave at least one of them with higher error.
First, we know from previous analysis that the large play-
ers always wish there were fewer other large players in a
coalition: the large players want ℓ2 < ℓ
′
2.
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Secondly, we know that the error the small player expe-
riences first increases and then decreases as ℓ increases. Is
it possible to pick an ℓ2 < ℓ
′
2 so that the small player gets
lower error there than in π(s1, ℓ1)?
Suppose that the derivative of err0(s2, ℓ) with respect
to ℓ is positive at ℓ = ℓ2: then, reducing ℓ from ℓ
′
2 to
ℓ2 might reduce the small player’s error. However, for ev-
ery point where the small player’s derivative is positive,
err0(s2, ℓ) > err0(s2, 0) > err0(S, 0): the small player
would not wish to move here because it would get strictly
higher error than it would get in π(S, 0).
Suppose instead that the derivative of of err0(s2, ℓ) with
respect to ℓ is negative or zero at ℓ = ℓ2. Then, if ℓ2 < ℓ
′
2,
reducing the number of large players in the coalition from
ℓ′2 to ℓ2 would increase the error of the small players. This
is also not an allocation that the small players would prefer.
Increasing ℓ, so that ℓ2 > ℓ
′
2 sufficiently large, would sat-
isfy the small player, but we already showed that it would
increase the error the large player experiences. As a result, it
is not possible to pick an allocation that both the small and
large players prefer to π(s1, ℓ1).
D Supporting lemmas for other models
(w-best, v-matrix)
w-best
In this case, the federated estimate differs for each player
and is
θˆwj = w · θˆj + (1− w) ·
1
N
M∑
i=1
θˆi · ni
forw ∈ [0, 1]. Note thatw can bewj : that is, each player can
have a different w parameter. For readability we will use wj
in the lemma below.
Lemma 7.1. For w−weighting federated learning, the ex-
pected MSE of a player with nj samples is:
µe
(
w2
nj
+
1− w2
N
)
+
∑
i6=j n
2
i + (N − nj)
2
N2
·(1−w)2σ2
Proof. We can use a similar process to the pure federated
case.
(θˆwj − θj)
2 = (θˆwj − θ
w
j + θ
w
j − θj)
2
= (θˆwj − θ
w
j )
2 + (θwj − θj)
2 + 2 · (θˆwj − θ
w
j ) · (θ
w
j − θj)
The expectation of the last term (taken with respect to the
data draws) is 0. Next, we look at the first term:
EY∼D(θi,ǫ2i )
[(θˆwj − θ
w
j )
2] = V ar(θˆwj )
= V ar
(
w · θˆj + (1− w) ·
1
N
M∑
i=1
θˆi · ni
)
= w2V ar(θˆj) +
(1− w)2
N2
V ar
(
M∑
i=1
θˆi · ni
)
+2 ·
w · (1− w)
N
Cov
(
θˆj ,
M∑
i=1
θˆi · ni
)
Simplifying some of the terms:
V ar
(
M∑
i=1
θˆi · ni
)
=
M∑
i=1
n2i · V ar(θˆi)
and
Cov
(
θˆj ,
M∑
i=1
θˆi · ni
)
=
M∑
i=1
Cov(θˆj , θˆi·ni) = nj ·V ar(θˆj)
where we have used that θˆj is independent of θˆi for i 6= j.
Collecting like terms gives:
V ar
(
θˆj
)(
w2 +
(1− w)2 · n2j
N2
+ 2
w · (1− w) · nj
N
)
+
(1− w)2
N2
∑
i6=j
n2i · V ar(θˆi)
Using σ2(θˆi) =
ǫ2i
ni
simplifies this to:
ǫ2j
nj
(
w2 +
(1− w)2 · n2j
N2
+ 2
w · (1− w) · nj
N
)
+
(1− w)2
N2
∑
i6=j
ni · ǫ
2
i
Taking the expectation E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ on each side produces:
µe
nj
(
w2 +
(1− w)2 · n2j
N2
+ 2
w · (1− w) · nj
N
)
+
(1− w)2
N2
∑
i6=j
ni · µe
Simplifying the coefficient gives:
=
µe
nj
(
w2 + 2
w · (1− w) · nj
N
)
+ µe
(1 − w)2
N2
M∑
i=1
ni
= µe
(
w2
nj
+ 2
w · (1− w)
N
)
+ µe
(1− w)2
N
= µe
(
w2
nj
+
1− w2
N
)
Finally, we look at the last term. First, we rewrite:
(θwj − θj)
2 =
(
w · θj +
1− w
N
M∑
i=1
θi · ni − θj
)2
=

1− w
N
∑
i6=j
θi · ni −
(1 − w) · (N − nj)
N
θj


2
=
(1− w)2
N2

∑
i6=j
θi · ni


2
+
(1− w)2 · (N − nj)2
N2
θ2j
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−2
(1− w)2 · (N − nj)
N2
θj ·
∑
i6=j
θi · ni
The first term can be rewritten as:
(1 − w)2
N2



∑
i6=j
θ2i · n
2
i

+ ∑
i,k 6=j,i6=k
θi · θk · ni · nk


If we take the expectation of the entire sum with respect
to drawing parameters for each player, we will obtain
some terms involving E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ[θ
2
i ] and some involving
E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ
[θi]
2. Collecting terms involving E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ[θ
2
i ]
gives:
E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ
[θ2i ]
N2
· (1− w)2

∑
i6=j
n2i + (N − nj)
2


Collecting terms involving E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ[θi]
2 gives:
E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ
[θi]
2
N2
(1−w)2

 ∑
i,k 6=j,i6=k
ni · nk − 2(N − nj)
2


Note that
(N − nj)
2 =
∑
i6=j
n2i +
∑
i,k 6=j,k 6=i
ni · nk
Substituting and rearranging the term inside the parentheses
gives us:
(N − nj)
2 −
∑
i6=j
n2i − 2(N − nj)
2
= −
∑
i6=j
n2i − (N − nj)
2
So the overall coefficient becomes:
−
E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ
[θi]
2
N2
· (1− w)2

∑
i6=j
n2i + (N − nj)
2


We can combine the E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ
[θi]
2 and E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ
[θ2i ]
terms because they share a common coefficient, giving us:∑
i6=j n
2
i + (N − nj)
2
N2
· (1− w)2·
(
E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ
[θ2i ]− E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ[θi]
2
)
=
∑
i6=j n
2
i + (N − nj)
2
N2
· (1− w)2 · σ2
where we have used σ2 = V ar(θj) = E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ[θ
2
i ] −
E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ
[θi]
2. The overall federated error becomes:
µe
(
w2
nj
+
1− w2
N
)
+
∑
i6=j n
2
i + (N − nj)
2
N2
·(1−w)2σ2
Lemma 7.2. The minimum error is always achieved when
wj < 1, implying that federation is always preferable to
local learning.
Proof. Taking the derivative of the error with respect to w
produces:
2µe
(
w
nj
−
w
N
)
− 2
∑
i6=j n
2
i + (N − nj)
2
N2
· (1 − w) · σ2
Setting this equal to 0 and solving for w produces wj equal
to
(
∑
i6=j n
2
i + (N − nj)
2) · σ2
µe ·N2 ·
(
1
nj
− 1
N
)
+ (
∑
i6=j n
2
i + (N − nj)
2) · σ2
Note that this value wj depends on the player j that it is in
reference to. It is also always strictly between 0 and 1.
To confirm that this is a point of minimum error rather
than maximum, we can take the second derivative of the er-
ror, which gives a result that is always positive:
2µe
(
1
nj
−
1
N
)
+ 2
∑
i6=j n
2
i + (N − nj)
2
N2
· σ2
v-matrix
In this case, the federated estimate differs for each player
and is:
θˆvj =
M∑
i=1
vjiθi
for
∑M
i=1 vji = 1. Note that we can recover the w weighting
case with vjj = w +
(1−w)·nj
N
and vji = (1 − w) ·
ni
N
.
Lemma 7.3. For mean estimation with the v-weighting fed-
erated learning method, the expected MSE of a player with
nj samples is:
µe
M∑
i=1
v2ji
ni
+

∑
i6=j
v2ji +

∑
i6=j
vji


2

 · σ2
Proof. We again use a similar approach to thew method and
the pure federated case.
(θˆvj − θj)
2 = (θˆvj − θ
v
j + θ
v
j − θj)
2
= (θˆvj − θ
v
j )
2 + (θvj − θj)
2 + 2 · (θˆvj − θ
w
j ) · (θ
v
j − θj)
The expectation of the last term (taken with respect to the
data draws) is 0. Next, we look at the first term and take the
expectation with respect to the data draws:
EY∼D(θi,ǫ2i )
[(θˆvj − θ
v
j )
2] = V ar(θˆvj ) = V ar
(
M∑
i=1
vjiθˆi
)
=
M∑
i=1
v2jiV ar(θˆi) =
M∑
i=1
v2ji
ǫ2i
ni
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Taking the expectation with respect to the parameters
E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ
gives:
µe
M∑
i=1
v2ji
ni
Finally, we look at the last term. First, we rewrite:
(θvj − θj)
2 =

(vjj − 1) · θj +∑
i6=j
vji · θi


2
We know that 1 = vjj+
∑
i6=j vji, so this sum can be rewrit-
ten as:
=

∑
i6=j
vji · (θi − θj)


2
=
∑
i6=j
v2ji ·(θi−θj)
2+
∑
i,k 6=j,i6=k
vji ·vjk ·(θi−θj) ·(θk−θj)
=
∑
i6=j
v2ji · (θ
2
i + θ
2
j − 2θi · θj)
+
∑
i,k 6=j,i6=k
vji · vjk · (θi · θk − θi · θj − θk · θj + θ
2
j )
Taking the expectation with respect to the parameter
draws produces terms that involve both E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ
[θ2i ] and
E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ
[θi]
2. Collecting like terms gives:
E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ
[θ2i ]

2∑
i6=j
v2ji +
∑
i,k 6=j,i6=k
vji · vjk


+E(θi,ǫ2i )∼Θ[θi]
2

−2∑
i6=j
v2ji −
∑
i,k 6=j,i6=k
vji · vjk


We can rewrite the coefficient using that (
∑
i6=j vji)
2 =∑
i6=j v
2
ji +
∑
i,k 6=j,i6=k vji · vjk:
= 2
∑
i6=j
v2ji +
∑
i,k 6=j,i6=k
vji · vjk
=
∑
i6=j
v2ji +

∑
i6=j
vji


2
For an overall error value of:
µe
M∑
i=1
v2ji
ni
+

∑
i6=j
v2ji +

∑
i6=j
vji


2

 · σ2
Lemma 7.4. Define Vi = σ
2 + µe
ni
. Then, the value of {vji}
that minimizes player j’s error is:
vjj =
1 + σ2
∑
i6=j
1
Vi
1 + Vj
∑
i6=j
1
Vi
and
vjk =
1
Vk
·
Vj − σ2
1 + Vj
∑
i6=j
1
Vi
Proof. To minimize, we will take the derivative of player
j’s error with respect to the vjk weight. Note that we only
have vjj = 1−
∑
i6=j vji = 1 − vjk −
∑
i6=j,i6=k vji so vjk
appears twice in the component involving µe. Rewriting the
error gives:
µe
M∑
i6=j
v2ji
ni
+ µe
(1−
∑
i6=j vji)
2
nj
+

∑
i6=j
v2ji +

∑
i6=j
vji


2

 · σ2
Taking the derivative with respect to vjk gives:
µe
2vjk
nk
− 2µe
1−
∑
i6=j vji
nj
+ σ2

2∑
i6=j
vji + 2vjk


To confirm that we are finding a minimum rather than a max-
imum, we note that the second derivative is always positive:
µe
2
nk
+ µe
2
nj
+ σ2 (2 + 2) > 0
We first simplify the derivative by substituting in for vjj :
µe
2vjk
nk
− 2µe
vjj
nj
+ 2σ2 (1− vjj + vjk) = 0
And then solve for vjk to obtain:
vjk =
vjj ·
(
σ2 + µe
nj
)
− σ2
σ2 + µe
nk
To find vjj , we use that all of the weights sum up to 1:
vjj +
∑
i6=j
vjj ·
(
σ2 + µe
nj
)
− σ2
σ2 + µe
nk
= 1
vjj +
∑
i6=j
vjj ·
(
σ2 + µe
nj
)
σ2 + µe
nk
−
∑
i6=j
σ2
σ2 + µe
nk
= 1
vjj

1 +∑
i6=j
σ2 + µe
nj
σ2 + µe
nk

−∑
i6=j
σ2
σ2 + µe
nk
= 1
vjj =
1 +
∑
i6=j
σ2
σ2+ µe
nk
1 +
∑
i6=j
σ2+µe
nj
σ2+ µe
nk
Next, we define Vi = σ
2 + µe
ni
. This allows us to rewrite the
term as:
vjj =
1 + σ2
∑
i6=j
1
Vi
1 + Vj
∑
i6=j
1
Vi
Similarly, we can rewrite:
vjk =
1
Vk
·
Vj − σ2
1 + Vj
∑
i6=j
1
Vi
19
